Anatomy of the Coaklastrophe

As a Democrat and Massachustts resident I had the misfortune to get a close up view of the Coaklastrophe. A particular lowpoint occurred when I sent the Coakley campaign an email saying that I would contribute if they actually spent the money to pay for something like political advertising. (Here's part of my email of January 5 to the Coakley campaign: "...I am willing to make a modest contribution, but given the lack of any advertising by your campaign I am concerned that you will not spend the money. Is that the case?"

The Coaklastrophe:

1. The interpretations of the Coaklastrophe are prone to confirming a given author’s previous views: moderate Democrats wills say that Obama has been too liberal, while progressive Democrats will say that Obama has been too moderate. The economy is obviously a major factor, and voters seem mighty quick to forget where their troubles began, but the Coaklastrophe was also the product of a series of internal failings.
2. From the start the Brown campaign outworked and outhustled the Coakley campaign. Brown went everywhere there was a microphone. He was judge on community audition. He went to Fenway Park. He went to schools. He gave the appearance of being everywhere. Meanwhile days at a time would go by without any appearance by Coakley. At the same time, Coakley’s refusal to do one-o-one debates reinforced the impression that she was hiding.
3. Coakley let Brown set the agenda every day. For weeks in December news stories about the race would being by noting bills that Brown was introducing at a frantic pace or new ads he was running. That the bills had little chance of ever being passed did not matter—he was gaining attention as the proactive candidate while the Coakley campaign was passive or reactive.
4. For nearly four weeks after the primary the Coakley campaign did not advertise at all while Brown did.
5. Coakley rejected criticism that she was not visible enough by suggesting that she did not see the point to campaigning out in the cold at Fenway Park. “ Coakley bristles at the suggestion that, with so little time left, in an election with such high stakes, she is being too passive,” the Boston Globe reported, “As opposed to standing outside Fenway Park? In the cold? Shaking hands?’’ she fires back, in an apparent reference to a Brown online video of him doing just that.” (http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/articles/2010/01/13/campaigns_brevity_shapes_coakley_image_on_trail/) She gave every impression that she did not want to campaign or seek the public’s support.
6. Through this inaction, the Coakley campaign created a vacuum for nearly four weeks while Brown ran hard. By the time she began to advertise he had essentially caught up with Coakley in the polls.
7. The Coakley campaign appeared unprepared for a close race. Bloggers on BlueMassGroup came up with many questionable stances by Brown that appeared to be unknown or unnoted by the Coakley campaign.
8. The Coakley campaign had counted on a financial advantage and a short calendar to win, but this strategy got turned precisely against Coakley When Brown got close he received an ocean of contributions from all over the country. She was out-advertised, outspent, and with only days to reverse her erosion Coakley had little time to counter the surge in support that Brown enjoyed, not only from “Teabaggers,” but also from some young voters and many Independents who saw him as the fresh, attractive candidate. In a longer campaign she might have staunched the bleeding, but the campaign Coakley had counted on exactly the kind of short calendar, which destroyed Coakley’s chances.
9. Were there other factors? Obviously yes, but few campaigns have ever made so many basic mistakes from beginning to end.

I only hope that health care reform and legislation to combat climate change can survive this debacle.